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Tarski’s indefinability theorem shows us that truth is not definable in
arithmetic. The requirement to define truth for a language in a stronger
language (if contradiction is to be avoided) lapses for particularly weak
languages. A weaker language, however, is not necessary for that lapse.
It also lapses for an adequately weak theory. It turns out that the set of
Go¨del numbers of sentences true in arithmetic modulo n is definable in
arithmetic modulo n.
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Introduction
Tarski’s indefinability theorem gives us that the set of Go¨del numbers of sen-
tences true in [arithmetic] is not definable in arithmetic (Boolos and Jeffrey
1989: 176). The requirement to define truth for a language in a stronger lan-
guage (if contradiction is to be avoided) lapses for particularly weak languages,
for example, Myhills system which lacks negation (Quine 1980:137 fn 10). But
a weaker language is not a prerequisite for that lapse. It also lapses for an ad-
equately weak theory. It turns out that the set of Go¨del numbers of sentences
true in arithmetic modulo n is definable in arithmetic modulo n.
Notation
• L is the first order language of arithmetic.
• Sent(L) is the set of closed sentences of L.
• 0M , +M , ×M etc. is what is denoted in a model M by the respective
members of L.
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• φ and ψ are always closed sentences of L .
• n is the symbol ss . . . s(0): n repetitions of s.
• [m] is the equivalence class of natural numbers defined by the relation
‘having the same remainder on division by n’: alternatively, and equiva-
lently, the element m+nZ in the quotient ring Z/nZ, (i.e. in Zn).
• # is a Go¨del coding
• pφq is the Go¨del numeral for #φ
• M is a model. In speaking of models M , I use ‘M ’ to refer both to
the model and its domain, unless the context requires them to be distin-
guished.
1 Qn: Modulo n arithmetic
We meet modular arithmetic in number theory, where congruence modulo n
aids the study of divisibility and in algebra as the quotient ring Z/nZ, whose
elements defined in terms of cosets of the ideal nZ turn out to be the equivalence
classes induced by the congruence relation. Modular arithmetic is the structure
of the ring of integers Zn.
For the purposes of this paper, Qn is modulo n arithmetic, for n>1, with
the following 7 axioms and 1 axiom schema:
1. n = 0
2. ∀x : (x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ . . . ∨ x = n− 1)
3. s(0) 6= 0
4. ∀x : x+ 0 = x
5. ∀x∀y : x+ s(y) = s(x+ y)
6. ∀x : x× 0 = 0
7. ∀x∀y : x× s(y) = x× y + x
8. Axiom schema. For any m that is a factor of n, m6= 0.1
1Factors of n, or multiples of such factors, are divisors of zero modulo n, which fact prevents
us proving the inequation m 6=0 from the axioms already given. We need the inequations to
guarantee the isomorphism of all models of Qn
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Properties of Qn
(i) Qn ` ∀x∀y(s(x) = s(y)→ x = y)).
(ii) Qn ` ∀x∃y(x = s(y)).
(iii) m 6≡ k (mod n) iff Qn ` m 6= k.
(iv) If j ≡ m+ k (mod n) then Qn ` j = m + k.
(v) If j ≡ m× k (mod n) then Qn ` j = m× k.
The intended model M of Qn is (D, [0], σ,⊕,⊗), defined by:
1. dom(M) = {[0], [1], . . . , [n− 1]}
2. for all k < n− 1, (σ[k]) = [k + 1]
3. σ([n− 1]) = [0]
4. [k]⊕ [l] = [k + l]
5. [k]⊗ [l] = [k × l]
Clearly, M|= Qn. M is just the ring Zn (or isomorphic to Zn if you prefer)
since for 0 ≤ m < n, [m] is the equivalence class of m (mod n), and so it is also
the relevant coset of the ideal nZ, and hence M = the quotient ring Z/nZ. It
is obvious from arithmetic that M satisfies R1 - 8. Straightforwardly we have
identities, inverses, associativity of and closure under ⊕ and ⊗, commutativity
of ⊕ and left and right distributivity of ⊗ over ⊕.
Interpretations of Qn will have to use 0 to name [0]. However, for some
n the numerals naming the other members of M will be permutable whilst
preserving truth. We shall make use of interpretations of Qn that use the
numeral m to name [m].
Proposition 1.1 If M |= Qn, then the domain of M has n members.
Proof. By the domain axiom, M has the form {0M, . . . , (n − 1)M} so the
domain has ≤ n members. There are n distinct elements by the inequations
(property (iii)) so the domain has ≥ n members. 
Theorem 1.2 All models of Qn are isomorphic to M.
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Proof.
Let M∗ |= Qn. Let ρ be the function ρ : M 7→M∗ such that: ρ : mM 7→ mM∗ .
ρ is a surjection. Suppose x ∈ M∗. Then x = mM∗ for some m in L. Hence
mM ∈M and ρ(mM) = mM∗
ρ is an injection. Suppose for a contradiction that mM 6= kM but ρ(mM) =
ρ(kM). Then Qn ` m 6= k (property (iii)) and hence, since Qn is sound,
mM
∗ 6= kM∗ . But if ρ(mM) = ρ(kM), then mM∗ = kM∗ , which is the
contradiction we sought.
Preservation of successor. We need to show that ρ(σ(mM)) = σ∗(ρ(mM)).
LHS of equation.
σ(mM) = σ([m]) = [m+ 1] = (m+ 1)M
so
ρ(σ(mM)) = ρ((m+ 1)M) = (m+ 1)M
∗









) = σ∗((m+ 0)M
∗
) = (m+ 1)M
∗
whence LHS = RHS.
Preservation of addition.















ρ([k]) = ρ([m]⊕ [k])
Preservation of multiplication. Similar proof to addition with ⊗ for ⊕, × for
+ and the use of property (v) instead of property (iv). 
Theorem 1.3 Qn is not weaker than the theory of rings.
Proof. Since M is a ring and all models of Qn are isomorphic, there cannot
be non-standard models (in which, e.g. ∀x∀y : x+ y = y+x is not true) which
can be used to show Qn is weaker. 
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Theorem 1.4 Qn is complete.
Proof. Suppose Qn is not complete. Then there is a sentence φ such that φ
is true in at least one model and false in at least one model of Qn. But this is
impossible, since all models are isomorphic. 
Corollary 1.5 For any model, M,Qn ` φ iff M |= φ.
Definition 1.6 The truth set Tn = {φ ∈ Sent(L) : M |= φ}
Corollary 1.7 All models of Qn have the same truth set (which is just the set
of theorems of Qn)
2 Finite Models
Theorem 2.1 For any finite model M the truth set is decidable.
Proof. First of all, the truth value of any atomic formulae can be determined
by a finite calculation, as can any finite Boolean combinations of such formulae.
Let φ be a formula of the form ∀x : χ(x), where χ has only x free. Then,
M |= φ iff M |= χ(0)∧χ(1)∧· · ·∧χ(n− 1). Likewise, an existentially quantified
formula ∃x : χ(x) can be expressed as a finite disjunction and M satisfies it iff
M satisfies the finite disjunction. Hence, any singly quantified formula can be
re-expressed as a finitely long Boolean combination.
An example will illustrate the general proof. Let φ be a closed prenex
formula ∀x1∃x2 : t(x1, x2) = u(x1, x2). We now inflate by use of the facts just
mention to get a formula satisfied by M iff M |= φ. From the outside moving
in we get
∃x2 : t(0, x2) = u(0, x2) ∧ ∃x2 : t(1, x2) = u(1, x2) ∧ . . .
· · · ∧ ∃x2 : t(n− 1, x2) = u(n− 1, x2)
and then
(t(0, 0) = u(0, 0) ∧ t(1, 0) = u(1, 0) ∧ · · · ∧ t(n− 1, 0) = u(n− 1, 0))
∨ . . . . . .
∨ . . . . . .
∨ (t(0, n− 1) = u(0, n− 1) ∧ t(1, n− 1) = u(1, n− 1) ∧ . . .
· · · ∧ t(n− 1, n− 1) = u(n− 1, n− 1))
This is a Boolean combination of a finite number of atomic formulae so its
truth value can be worked out by a finite calculation.
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Evidently, any closed prenex formula with m quantifiers at the front can be
inflated in stages in this way to a Boolean combination of nm atomic formulae
each of the form t(x1, . . . , xm) = u(x1, . . . , xm) Once again, its truth value can
be worked out by a finite calculation.
Therefore a Turing machine can determine whether a closed formula be-
longs to Tn, and hence the characteristic function of Tn is recursive. 
Theorem 2.2 The truth set for models of Qn is decidable.
Proof. Apply proposition 1.1, theorem 2.1 and corollary 1.7. Models of Qn
are finite so have decidable truth sets, which are all identical. 
Theorem 2.3 Qn is decidable.
Proof. For any model M of Qn, the truth set Tn of M is decidable. Qn ` φ
iff M |= φ so any decision procedure for Tn will yield a decision procedure for
Qn 
3 The Truth Predicate for Qn
A truth predicate for Qn, satisfying Tarski’s material adequacy condition would
be a predicate Tn(x) such that for all φ,Qn ` Tn(pφq)↔ φ
Lemma 3.1 pφqM = [#φ]
Proof. pφq is the Go¨del numeral for #φ so the object in M named by it is
[#φ] 
Definition 3.2 Let Θ be any theory in the language L, M be any model of
Θ. An acceptable M coding for a theory Θ is a Go¨del coding # such
that for any closed formulas φ, ψ, if pφqM = pψqM then for any model M∗ of
Θ,M∗ |= φ iff M∗ |= ψ
We are interested only in acceptable M codings for Qn, which from hereon
we call acceptable codings. Not all codings are acceptable for Qn. The simplest
unacceptable coding can be got by an injection from expressions into the set
of multiples of n (see proposition 4.1 below).
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Lemma 3.3 For acceptable codings #, for any closed formulas φ, ψ, any of
the following equivalent propositions:
1. (a) pφqM = pψqM
(b) #φ ≡ #ψ (mod n)
(c) [#φ] = [#ψ]
implies any of the following equivalent propositions:
2. (a) M |= φ iff M |= ψ
(b) φ ∈ Tn iff ψ ∈ Tn
(c) M |= φ↔ ψ
(d) Qn ` φ↔ ψ
Proof. The definition gives us that if 1(a) then 2(a) and so equivalents to
1(a) imply equivalents to 2(a). 
Lemma 3.4 Let # be an acceptable coding and φ, ψ closed formulae. If #φ ≡
#ψ (mod n) then φ ∈ Tn iff ψ ∈ Tn.
Proof. Using the aforementioned equivalences 
Remarks 3.5 Essentially, this lemma is telling us that an acceptable coding
is a Go¨del coding such that if the Go¨del numbers of two closed sentences in
L are in the same equivalence class modulo n, then they have the same truth
value.
Lemma 3.6 For any Qn an acceptable Go¨del coding exists.
Proof. Let P be the set of primes and R the set of primes in the prime
factorisation of n. Use P\R as the basis for a powers of primes Go¨del coding
g. Then define the following function # : L 7→ N
#φ =
{
n× g(φ) if φ ∈ Tn
g(φ) if φ /∈ Tn
By the unique prime factorisation theorem # is an injection and
#φ ∈ Tn iff [#φ] = [0] (since for all φ, n is a factor of n× g(φ))
#φ /∈ Tn iff [#φ] 6= [0] (since for all φ, n is a not factor of n× g(φ))
If the characteristic functions of the conditions for a function defined by cases
from recursive functions are themselves recursive then the function defined by
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cases is also recursive. Since Tn is decidable the characteristic function for
membership of Tn is recursive. Both g and multiplication by n are recursive
functions. Hence # is recursive. Therefore # is a Go¨del coding. For any φ, ψ, φ
and ψ will have Go¨del numbers congruent modulo n only if they have the same
truth value. Therefore # is an acceptable coding. 
Definition 3.7 We make use of an acceptable coding, #.
Let Kn = {k1, . . . , ki} be the set such that
k ∈ Kn iff 0 ≤ k < n and there exists a φ such that φ ∈ Tn and
k ≡ #φ (mod n)
So Kn is the set of numbers between 0 and n − 1 which are congruent to the
Go¨del numbers of the true sentences of Qn.
Lemma 3.8 If # is acceptable then for any φ, φ ∈ Tn iff for some k ∈
Kn, [#φ] = [k].
Proof. Suppose that φ ∈ Tn. By the division algorithm for some r such
that 0 ≤ r < n, #φ ≡ r (mod n) and hence r ∈ Kn. Suppose that for
some k ∈ Kn, k ≡ #φ (mod n). Then for some ψ ∈ Tn, k ≡ #ψ (mod n),
so #φ ≡ #ψ (mod n), hence φ ∈ Tn iff ψ ∈ Tn (because # is acceptable),
whence φ ∈ Tn 
Theorem 3.9 Let the open L-formula Tn(x) be the open formula (x = k1∨x =
k2 ∨ · · · ∨ x = ki). Tn(x) defines truth in Qn (and hence in M).
Proof. We make use of an acceptable coding, #.
For any φ ∈ Sent(L), Qn ` Tn(pφq)
iff M|= Tn(pφq) (soundness and completeness)
iff M|= [(pφq = k1) ∨ (pφq = k2) ∨ · · · ∨ (pφq = ki)
iff either [#φ] = [k1] or[#φ] = [k2] or ... or [#φ] = [ki]
iff, for some k, [#φ] = [k] and k ∈ Kn
iff φ ∈ Tn (by lemma 3.8)

Theorem 3.10 Tn(x) is a truth predicate satisfying Tarskis material adequacy
condition, i.e. for all φ ∈ Sent(L), Qn ` Tn(pφq)↔ φ
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Proof. Given any φ, M |= Tn(pφq) iff φ ∈ Tn iff M|= φ, hence M|=
Tn(pφq)↔ φ, whence by completeness we have Qn ` Tn(pφq)↔ φ 
We have now proved our main result. The set of Go¨del numbers of sentences
true in arithmetic modulo n is definable in arithmetic modulo n, Qn, by the
predicate Tn(x). Hence for all n, arithmetic modulo n is a theory containing
its own truth predicate.
4 Coding, representability and acceptability.
Clearly, the set of Go¨del numbers for a set of expressions, and representability
in general, is relative to coding: but in Q (Robinson arithmetic) and extensions
of Q all codings can be shown to be N acceptable, simply because Go¨del codings
must be injections into N. For the same reason, for all the non-standard models
NS of Q of which I am aware, in which the domain is got by adding extra
elements to N, all codings are NS acceptable. So in general, relativity to
coding is irrelevant and not discussed for that reason.
However, when using L for a theory of a finite model then the syntax may
no longer be properly represented in the theory. Although any coding will
still be injective into N, and although there will still be an injection from N
to the numerals of L , any theory which induces a partition on the numerals
is in danger of proving that for distinct φ, ψ, pφq = pψq. Of course, it is only
in danger of doing this if at least one equivalence class has more than one
member. In Qn the relation inducing the partition can be defined by x ∼ y
iff Qn ` x = y, and since there are infinite numerals and only n equivalence
classes of numerals, Qn is in that danger. Indeed, there is a coding for Qn
which ensures that for all φ, ψ,Qn ` pφq = pψq.
Proposition 4.1 For any n > 1 there exists a Go¨del coding of a language
L which makes the code of every formula and its negation congruent to zero
modulo n.
Proof. Take any Go¨del coding #. # maps L into N (is an injection). Let g
be a function g : N 7→ N, g : x 7→ nx. Then let f : L 7→ N, f : x 7→ g(#x).
Both g and # are injections and hence f is an injection from L into N and
as such is a Go¨del coding. Under f all formulas of L are congruent to 0 modulo
n, a fortiori , so is each formula and its negation. 
Hence the need for an acceptable coding if anything of significance is to be
got out of a coding. But even with an acceptable coding, coding of the syntax
of L into any model of Qn will be many-one and consequently the capacity for
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representation of relations of the models must be fairly crude. The proof above
shows that being the code of a true sentence is definable. Adapting the Qn
acceptable coding given above in a fairly obvious manner would create what
Ketland calls a Frege coding.
Definition 4.2 A Frege Coding Fc. Given a model M , pick any two ele-




a if M |= φ
b if M |= ¬φ
Intuitively, a and b are just the two truth values, ‘The True’ and ‘The False’.
Definition 4.3 A Frege Coding for Qn. In our case we can define Fc ,
using the acceptable coding of lemma 3.6.
Fc(φ) =
{
[1] if #φ ≡ 0 (mod n)
[0] if #φ 6≡ 0 (mod n)
It might be that the capacity for representation in Qn is so crude that very
little else is representable or definable. I dont know. I havent investigated
representability or definability in general for Qn. The following results may be
relevant to the problems of definability and representability in Qn:
Corollary 4.4 Given an acceptable coding, the diagonal function is not rep-
resentable in Qn relative to that coding.
Proof. If the diagonal function were representable, we could derive a contra-
diction in the standard way. But Qn is consistent (it has a model). 
Corollary 4.5 Introduce a new predicate T ∗(x) and let DT ∗ be the set of all
axioms T ∗(pφq ↔ φ), with φ ∈ Sent(L). Then Qn ∪ DT ∗is a conservative
extension of Qn .
Proof. Take any model M . Define an expansion (M,E) by interpreting
the new predicate T ∗(x) as the set E, where E is got from the set Kn defined
above as follows
mM ∈ E iff for some k ∈ Kn,m ≡ k (mod n).
Then (M,E) |= Qn ∪DT ∗. (Plainly E is definable in Qn). 
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5 Final remarks
First we note some further questions worth asking. 1) Are there codings by
which we can show M to be an acceptable structure? 2) Could it be that
acceptability is not a problem in free logic?
A reservation that might be raised is whether Tn(x) is properly called a
truth predicate? Certainly we have seen that it satisfies Tarksi’s material
adequacy condition. Nevertheless, you might reject it because you deny the
coding we used being a Go¨del coding. However, since such coding can never be
one-one into a finite model, it is the best coding we can get, and it is sufficient
for truth. So this reservation appears pedantic and we set it aside.
In theorem 3.10 we proved our main result. Since for all n, the set of
Go¨del numbers of sentences true in arithmetic modulo n is definable by the
predicate Tn(x), arithmetic modulo n is a simple theory containing its own
truth predicate.2
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